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My name is Rebecca and I am a flawed liberal. Indeed, I fear I am the
person that this Discussion Group is about. I have such consistently liberal
positions on nearly all things that a recent online candidate-matching test
placed me at a 100% overlap with Al Sharpton. I voted for McGovern, for
Dukakis, and only reluctantly for Clinton because he was too centrist for my
taste. Ted Kennedy has never out-lefted me. I care first and foremost about
individual rights and the protection of liberty from encroachment by
overzealous and ungenerous majoritarian institutions. Yet –when it comes
to the First Amendment, my sterling liberal credentials show a bit of tarnish.
I have always hated Buckley v. Valeo, and not only the part invalidating
contribution limits—I even deplore the basic claim that money is speech. I
welcomed the recent McConnell decision as a hint of movement in the other
direction, notwithstanding the inelegance of the opinion(s) and the
pathetically ineffectual nature of the campaign finance reform law it upheld.
My confession must also include an acknowledgment that I was the only
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person I knew who was deeply rankled by the Supreme Court’s striking
down of the law prohibiting virtual kiddy porn. My blood boils at the high
degree of protection given to hate speech. And, ashamed though I am to
admit it, I also own up to having felt very uncomfortable over the years with
the ACLU’s penchant for spending its limited resources defending the
causes of Nazis and the Klan.
The question is, am I in need of a twelve-step program, or are the
views I describe representative of some legitimate, and still liberal,
perspective on constitutional law? Do I really believe less in freedom,
constitutional democracy and individual rights than I thought I did, or else
these terrible truths about me would not emerge every few Supreme Court
Terms? Having gotten the confession out of the way, I wish to devote the
remainder of this brief sketch to exploring how a liberal might, without
hypocrisy, defend these seemingly inconsistent perspectives.
We all recognize that there are different visions of democracy that can
be defended, even under the single American Constitution. Because that
document and its history encompass so many strands of political thought,
interwoven to create a complex democratic fabric, one can find threads of
liberalism, pluralism, majoritarianism, republicanism, and any number of
other –isms that might plausibly be said to characterize the country’s basic
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commitments. This richness gives rise to lively debates in constitutional
scholarship, and leads to radically different interpretative theories.1
Even liberalism itself is not a unified set of commitments or
understandings about the entailments of democracy. The letter announcing
this Discussion Group suggests a general correlation between “liberal”
thought and hostility to government regulation, along with a corresponding
“conservative” hostility to constitutional limits on government power.
Characterized this way, the drift that we perceive might be thought to
suggest a retreat of liberals from their commitments when they, in keeping
with my opening confession, support certain regulation in the face of
constitutional attack.

This phenomenon was identified in connection with

Jack Balkin’s intriguing suggestion over a decade ago of a latter-day legal
realism insinuating itself into the consideration of modern free speech
theory.2
Another way to think about it is to consider what it is that liberals
expect from their government. The perspective of the “flawed liberal” as
contrasted with the true liberal can be roughly, but perhaps profitably,
compared to two schools of liberalism, described as “comprehensive
1
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liberalism” and “political liberalism.”3 Painting with a broad brush, these
two perspectives can be contrasted by the justifications that they offer for the
adoption of a liberal state. The more traditional, comprehensive, liberal
school sees the best state as one that provides political institutions and laws
that maximize some other good, such as happiness, human flourishing, or
equality and independence. The comprehensive liberal thus implements
some philosophical viewpoint and adopts the liberal state as the best way to
achieve that commitment. Theorists have, of course, disagreed on what that
background commitment should be. The so-called “political liberal”
justification for the liberal state departs from this traditional idea by seeking
to justify the state irrespective of any substantive background commitment.
Rawls, for example, offers a more “freestanding” view of society that is not
dependent on a background substantive moral theory.4 It claims to avoid the
age-old philosophical battles occasioned by reasonable pluralism by
constructing a state that does not self-consciously adopt or promote any
philosophical or moral doctrine.
These different teleological commitments between political
liberalism, on the one hand, and comprehensive liberalism on the other, have
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given rise, in less abstract contexts, to some generalizations about
appropriate limits on state behavior under the two types of regime. In
particular, some have suggested that these perspectives give rise to different
views of a state’s obligation to remain neutral with regard to competing
moral ideals held by its citizens.5 Political liberalism is committed to
ensuring that a state does not privilege any of the competing understandings
of the good life, and holds as a core value state neutrality with respect to all
such understandings, out of respect for pluralism.6 The justification for this
conviction lies in the recognition that no single principle or ideal can
command universal belief among people, and that, therefore, justice requires
that none of them be privileged by the basic political institutions of society.7
This commitment ensures that no controversial ideal of the good will be
called upon to justify the fundamental political principles under which all
must live. Rather, the state will adhere only to the appropriately “political”
commitments, such as the political conception of persons as free and equal,
while remaining impartial as to the more comprehensive moral doctrines
held by private individuals. Neutrality is the required posture for
government, with respect both to its ends (not selecting among contested
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values) and its means (not acting in a way that gives preference to any
perspective or group).
Applying the general principles of comprehensive liberalism to
government behavior requires some choice among the background
philosophies that the comprehensive liberal embraces. The central objective
of this strand of liberalism is to enable the state to facilitate the moral lives
of its citizens, and thus to contribute to their fulfillment as human beings.
Many believe that the particular conception of the good to which a general
comprehensive liberalism is committed must be the promotion of individual
self-definition or autonomy. According to this belief, the state’s proper role
is not merely to leave citizens as it finds them to work out their lives for
themselves. Rather, the state may have an affirmative obligation to promote
human flourishing, inevitably involving itself in endorsing some substantive
values consistent with its underlying commitments.
A state meets its obligation to promote flourishing by allowing people
to make real choices about the directions that their lives will take, uncoerced
by design or circumstance. It happens that, in privileging this ideal of
autonomy, the state will often find it necessary or desirable to remain
neutral. This is not because neutrality is itself an objective of the state, but
because in many cases state neutrality will be the best way to promote the
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value of autonomy by increasing freedom of choice for citizens. For
example, if a state stays out of all religious discourse, citizens will generally
have an unconstrained choice about their own religious preferences. This
approach would satisfy political and comprehensive liberals alike.
For comprehensive liberals, however, it may sometimes become
necessary for the state to promote certain ways of life rather than others, in
the interest of autonomy as the greatest moral good. For example, if one
particularly intolerant religion became so dominant in the private sector that
people of other religions were subjected to rampant discrimination in
employment, housing, and private social institutions, the comprehensive
liberal might well determine that the state had an obligation to use
government vehicles to open the doors of opportunity for the excluded
groups. It is apparent, then, that political and comprehensive liberalism are
not merely two means to the same end. The former sees state neutrality as a
defining and constitutive precept, while the latter employs it as needed to
further its own constitutive ideals, autonomy being a commonly identified
such ideal.
Both the adoption of autonomy as the goal of the state and the
commitment to state neutrality reflect the origins of liberalism itself. By
rejecting the once-dominant world view that assigned individuals, by birth,
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to roles in life that placed them permanently in some immutable position in a
hierarchical political society, liberalism replaced a belief in natural hierarchy
with a belief in natural equality. The liberal innovation saw political society
as needing a justification consistent with the premise of equality. Both of
these variants on liberalism supply such a justification.
The point of divide between the two comes when circumstances are
such that merely remaining neutral will not permit the state to ensure the
attainment of individual flourishing for some citizens. When faced with this
dilemma, the political liberal must sacrifice flourishing for the sake of
neutrality; the comprehensive liberal will, if necessary, sacrifice neutrality
for the sake of individual fulfillment. State coercion of individual choice
would offend both liberal schools by undermining both autonomy and
neutrality. But the comprehensive liberal goes further than simply
condemning state coercion. The comprehensive liberal claims that just as
the state has the unique ability and duty to protect life, liberty, and property
against dangers posed by other individuals, so too it may have an obligation
to counter constraints on autonomy generated by private elements of society.
This is not a very different conclusion from the one, reached via a different
route, “that public expansion or contraction of rights is really an issue of
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relations of power between private individuals.”8 This point addressed the
aspect of free speech having to do with access, but seems to me to apply
across First Amendment law and, perhaps, beyond. Whenever economic,
educational, or informational barriers impede the exercise of meaningful life
choices, it could well be said that “[a] libertarian conception of free speech
[or rights in general?] has served us well in the past, but like all conceptions,
it can and eventually must run out of steam and degenerate into a sterile
conception that will hinder progressive reform rather than aid it.” 9
Although probably not true of all theorists who profess
comprehensive liberalism, I understand this approach to fit very well with
constitutional theory that places a high value on equality. Indeed, if one
posits a thick and robust notion of equality as a starting point for political
justice, it may well follow that governments have some obligation, or at least
could be permitted, to address gross disparities in ways that a libertarian
view would not support, nor would a liberal view committed to state
neutrality.
Turning to some of the examples with which I began, the idiosyncratic
instincts may in fact fall together in some sort of intelligible pattern. A
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defense of limits on campaign finance reform could be understood in a
manner that is consistent with comprehensive liberal theory. The argument
would be that, just as it would be unthinkable for a state affirmatively to
allow any type of endowment to entitle one person to a louder voice than
others have in the political process, it is likewise not defensible to allow
wealth to accomplish the same thing passively through the private ordering
of the channels of mass communication. That is, the state would be using its
regulatory authority to equalize an unequal access to the means of
persuasion. Surprisingly, Ronald Dworkin raised a similar argument in his
attack on Buckley v. Valeo, when he suggested that the self-government
contemplated by our democracy includes the rights of those who wish to
command the attention of others as well as those who wish to hear what
others have to say.10 Thus, he argued, the Supreme Court had incorrectly
viewed the campaign expenditure limits as interferences with the selfgovernment protected by the First Amendment.
The prohibition of hate speech seems the easiest of all regulations to
justify under a comprehensive liberal approach to the First Amendment.
The idea is that, if the state’s obligation is to promote the flourishing of all
its citizens, a primary obligation is to ensure that each citizen is able to
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participate on equal terms in the informal cultural life of the community, to
be a full-fledged participant in the moral and social environment, and to live
a life undiminished by the condemnations of others. Thus, while the neutralstate type of liberalism believes that the state’s obligation to its citizens is
compromised when government prohibits speech on the ground that it is
offensive or degrading,11 the comprehensive view should suggest just the
opposite. That is, speech is protected for the purpose of promoting selfgovernment, but speech that tries to exclude some from the polity, by
claiming that they are of inferior status in some essential way, offends the
premise of equality and thus should not be part of the realm of protected
expression. An application of Dworkin’s principle of equal concern and
respect ought, in my view, if not Dworkin’s,12 to lead to the same
conclusion. Other countries such as Germany, for example, have explicitly
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Dworkin at 21.
Dworkin most assuredly does not support this application of his principle of equal
concern and respect. He believes there is a strong egalitarian claim to have the chance to
be heard, but not a comparable equality-based interest in not being degraded or
dehumanized by the speech of others. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law 236-237 (1996).
With tremendous respect, I do think his own principles could plausibly be applied
differently. For example, he states that self-government is not guaranteed “unless all the
members of the community in question are moral members. German Jews were not
moral members of the political community that tried to exterminate them, though they
had votes in the elections that led to Hitler’s Chancellorship….” Id. at 23. It is not a
large step to say that a government that feels the need to restrict some forms of hate
speech for the purpose of protecting the moral status of citizens, although not required
constitutionally to do so, may do so without violating the First Amendment.
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determined that the principle of equality should override the freedom to
degrade, diminish and exclude from full moral status via speech.
In my children’s lower school, there are only two rules regulating
speech on the playground. One is no teasing, and the other is, “You can’t say
you can’t play.” These are two rules that I suggest illustrate the application
of the comprehensive liberal commitment to ensuring equal moral status.
The teasing goes to the degradation that is analogous to hate speech. The
“can’t play” rule goes to the heart of what it means to be a participant in the
community. In this respect, the equality principle gives rise to certain
entitlements to liberty—the liberties necessary to enjoy full membership in
the relevant polity. It should not offend the liberal credo to stifle the one
expression so antithetical to self-government—exclusion.
In the end, it seems to me to be unhelpful to focus too much on what
liberals would or ought to think about regulation and rights. The real
question that the “ideological shift” points to is what we expect from our
government, in an age of increasing heterogeneity of both circumstance and
values among people. Especially in light of increasing polarization of
wealth and poverty, the deep liberal commitments that might naturally lead
us to prefer state neutrality in times of greater background fairness may now
legitimately lead us to question that neutrality as insufficient to permit our
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nation to meet the new challenges we face. A more robust, affirmative
employment of equality principles may be called for to help us get past the
idea that if the state simply does not legislate harm, the private sphere will
take care of itself. In allowing our commitments to evolve with societal
change in this way, we have not lost our claim to liberalism. We just need a
few support sessions with Flawed Liberals Anonymous.
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